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CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF GROWTH
BY CONGLOMERATE MERGER:
AN INTRODUCTION
JOEL DEAN*
A worm's-eye view of conglomerates in action may be useful as back-
ground for the olympian discussions of public policy and antitrust law
which grace this volume.
Conglomerate could be defined as any company that operates in sev-
eral different and unrelated markets; GE and GM would meet this test.
I use conglomerate here to refer to a company which in the 1960's has rou-
tinely acquired a large number of companies which operate in different
markets. Thus the hallmarks of the companies I am discussing are (1) that
they have grown importantly through acquisitions and (2) that their oper-
ating divisions are diverse and numerous.
Four anthropological questions about causes and consequences of con-
glomerate mergers are examined in this introductory essay:
I. What caused the population explosion of conglomerates?
II. What traits makes a company a tempting take-over candidate for a
conglomerate?
III. What are the chief sources of potential economic superiority of the
conglomerate?
IV. What are the main economic deficiencies of a conglomerate?
I. CAUSES OF POPULATION EXPLOSION OF CONGLOMERATES
We have had three major business merger episodes in the last century:
1875 to 1902, peaking in 1899; 1924 to 1930, peaking in 1929; and 1965
to date (which probably peaked in 1969). What explains the recent burst
of activity in the formation and growth of conglomerates? It is too early
to tell. The 10 explanations suggested in this section are put forward with
trepidation. They may turn out to be more entertaining than valid. They
are of three kinds: (A) those that can be laid at the doors of the Govern-
ment (1-3); (B) those attributable to conditions in the securities market
(4-8); and (C) those deriving from new techniques (9-10).
1. Antitrust Suits
The success of the antitrust agencies before the Supreme Court leads
many executives to believe that courts have barred the way to horizontal,
A.B., Pomona College, 1927; M.B.A., Harvard University, 1929; Ph.D., University of
Chicago, 1936. Professor of Business Economics, Columbia University Graduate School of
Business and Graduate Faculty of Political Science 194441969 (Emeritus Professor since
1969). President, Joel Dean Associates, 1940 to date.
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vertical, and substitute mergers by large companies, thereby making con-
glomerates the only feasible avenue of merger growth. Horizontal acqui-
sitions, no matter how small the overlap, look hopeless (United States v.
Von's Grocery Co.'). Vertical acquisitions, after Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States2 appear unpromising. And after FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.
3
(Clorox), even acquisitions of products related only by common distribution
and by potential entry might be challenged. Hence growth by merger was
driven into conglomerates by the courts (or perhaps by executives' mis-
construction of court decisions).
2. Taxes
The tax laws have supplied an incentive to merge. By making pos-
sible "tax free" mergers,4 by causing difficult estate-tax liquidity problems
for the owners of hard-to-market stock, by creating an impellingly superior
estate tax situation should one sell out to a conglomerate when his estate
was mostly in the form of closely held, nonmarketable stock, mainly the tax
laws created willing sellers.
3. Easy Credit
Expansion of money supply at a pace faster than the real economic
growth of the economy, coupled with general ease of credit to the financial
community and low interest rates, enabled companies with slender resources
to take over huge corporations. Vast supplies of cheap credit accessible to
merger promoters made available the financial resources needed in the short
run for buying the stock and for financing the tender offer.
4. Magnificent Market
The size, perfection, impersonality and anonymity of our securities mar-
kets permit speedy and secret acquisition of a discomfittingly large propor-
tion of the previously dispersed ownership of a candidate company.
Buoyant prices of conglomerate stocks, which facilitated acquisitions
in the late 1960's, have now declined enough to create a barrier to further
merger growth. Table I (on page 17), which shows acquisitions of nine con-
glomerates, indicates their stock price declines.
5. Investment Performance
A new concept and measurement of the portfolio manager's "investment
performance" has helped to supply a favorable environment for conglom-
erates. The concept of owner welfare is correct: true discounted cash flow
1384 U.S. 270 (1966).
2 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
3 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966).
4 Favorable tax rulings deferred capital gains taxation from the date of merger to
the date of sale of stock (or of death), thereby conferring the coveted "tax free" label and
removing a minor economic and major psychological barrier to merger.
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LTV
Litton
Gulf & Western
Whittaker
Textron
TRW
Grace
ITT
Teledyne
TABLE I
AcquISITIONS & STOCK PRcEs oF CONGLOMERATES
Number of Stock Prices
Acquisitions 1968-69 Percent
1958-68 High 3/20/70 Decline
21 $136 $21 85%
77 104 26 75
87 66 17 74
38 94 12 87
51 58 23 60
25 60 34 43
42 53 22 58
44 62 52 16
78 45 23 50
Average 61%
Dow Jones
Industrial Average 998 763 23
Standard & Poor
Industrial Average 118 87 26
analysis (DCF) rate of return of dividends plus market appreciation, related
to market value.5 But to be significant as a yardstick of performance, the
DCF return should, I think, both be adjusted for risk and averaged over a
long period. Used short-term without risk allowance, it clothes speculation
with professional respectability. How has it fostered conglomerates? In sev-
eral devious ways: first, it supplies a warrant for a high multiple for a true
"growth" stock (which all conglomerates aspire to be); second, it produced
fabulous price rises of conglomerates, based on the belief that the steep
short-term growth rate of earnings per share reported by their accounts was
indefinitely projectable. 6 Understandably, rapid and uninterrupted growth
in earnings per share is the central objective of the modern conglomerate.
A third way is to impel the shift of portfolio management into banks and
investment trusts and bring to the fore a new kind of performance-oriented
professional portfolio manager.
6. High-Multiple Myth
Belief that a "growth company" could be created by an indefinite suc-
cession of conglomerate mergers produced a Wall Street wonder based partly
5 Capital appreciation (positive or negative, realized or not) must be included in the
measure of investment performance. And capital appreciation (or decline) must be based
on changes in the market value of assets. To use cost or book value for valuation in
measuring and comparing investment performance is clearly absurd. But it is still widely
used for pension funds and even defended on the grounds that because they do not need
much liquidity they often invest in assets for which markets are imperfect and thin. A
thin market makes it harder to estimate current market prices but does not reduce the
need. These valuation difficulties can be overcome by methods and standards that I discuss
in Measuring the Investment Performance of Pension Funds, Bank Administration Insti-
tute, Park Ridge, 1968, at 44-69, 183-188.
G From 1963 to 1968 the average price of four established conglomerates (Litton,
Textron, LTV and ITT) rose from an index of 100 in 1963 to over 450 at the end of 1968.
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on the mystique of the unlimited versatility of "free-form" management.
For a few crucial years, the market environment perpetuated the high
multiplier of the conglomerate-acquirer (e.g., Litton, Gulf and Western) and
made each acquisition fuel for another.
The high-multiple myth is the belief that a company whose stock sells
at a high earnings-multiple, because its gradient of growth in earnings per
share has been steady and steep, can keep its multiple high and its price
kiting indefinitely by a succession of slow-growth acquisitions by trading its
own high-multiple (e.g., 40 times earnings) stock (usually via convertible
preferred) for the low-multiple stock (e.g., 10 times earnings) of the pedes-
trian growth companies it buys. This myth has powered the formation and
growth of many conglomerates.
7. Institutional Ownership
Institutional ownership of the stock of a target company makes that
stock particularly susceptible to the blandishments of a conglomerate. How?
Ownership is knowable, the block is big, and the tender offer (or private
deal) gives the money manager the quick, measurable "investment perform-
ance" (mostly appreciation in the market price of the security) that he lives
by.
8. Investopoids
The emergence of a new breed, investopoids (professional investors of
(another's) money) has abetted conglomeration. How? The changed criterion
of portfolio manager competence (DCF performance), plus the dramatically
increased proportion of ownership of stock of American corporations by
portfolio managing institutions (mutual funds, pension trusts, etc.) that
are run by this new breed of investopoids, make increasingly large propor-
tions of the stock of industrial companies highly susceptible to the typical
conglomerate tender offer. The tender produces instant "performance."
Moreover, ownership of the stock is more concentrated, more visible and
more accessible to the new professional tender chasers.
9. Management Sciences
The new technology of the management sciences: mathematical models,
statistical costing, probability surfaces, scientific sampling, computer simula-
tion, profit center decentralization, etc., has fostered conglomerates by pro-
moting belief in the mystique of modern professional management's ability
to manage anything equally well and to extend its span of control indefi-
nitely with a new management technology. For example, profit center de-
centralization, a technological advance of the new science of managerial
economics, has fostered conglomerates by making plausible two inconsistent
aspirations: continuation of complete independence of the old management
of the acquired company and strong modern central controls by a "profes
sional". top-management of the conglomerate. A quarter century of mostly
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successful experience with profit centers reveals limitations which are par-
ticularly serious for the diverse divisions of a modern conglomerate, and
which will be examined later.
10. Advanced Acquisition Technology
Advances in the technology of acquisitions are a contributory cause to
the recent wave of conglomerate mergers. Techniques of the tender offer
have been improved and refined.They are supplemented by the ministrations
of a new profession: the stockholder relations politician who, for a fee, will
peddle the tender and get out the~vote.A key concept for keeping the conglomerate's stock rising and its stock-
holders permissive about acquisitions is to manage reported earnings so as
to produce a steep and steady growth in earnings per share. The acquisition
process itself could in the late 1960's achieve this. First, an increment in per
share earnings usually resulted from the share exchange rates; e.g., if a con-
glomerate priced at 40 times earnings could trade its stock for an acquired
company whose earnings multiple was 10, its per share earnings were thereby
stepped up. Second, earnings of the acquired company were frequently
stepped up at least temporarily; sometimes assistance (or milking) increased
its profit margin; sometimes (accidentally or by design) an acquisition oc-
curred in the midst of a cyclical upswing. The resulting growth in earnings
was usually projected as a trend. It was steeper than the acquired company's
true historical trend would suggest. Third, some (possibly temporary) im-
provement in earnings resulted from better financial controls, synergism or
just sheer shake-up.
The amount of projectable growth in earnings per share that resulted
from these three phases of the acquisition process was often masked by ac-
counting practices designed to conceal internal growth of earnings and to
prevent discrimination between ephemeral and persistent growth. In the
euphoria of those times, there was a widespread belief that the source of
growth in earnings per share did not matter for its projectability so long
as that growth was rapid and uninterrupted. Consequently, during 1967 and
much of 1968, the high multiple of the acquirer (rather than some average
of 40 and 10) tended to continue for the composite, based on faith in the
projectability of "managed earnings."
The advanced technology of "managed earnings" called for sophisti-
cated and creative use of the wide zone of bookkeeping discretion in report-
ing assets, reserves, and earnings of acquisitions. Thus imaginative exploita-
tion of highly permissive accountancy has been an important part of
acquisition technology.
Dilution is an important aspect of the fuzziness of reporting techniques
of acquisition companies. Since about 1967, some of the dilution impact
had to be revealed, Gulf 8c Western stockholders found out during 1968 that
earnings for fiscal 1967 were $2.84, not $3.69 as earlier reported. From this
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new benchmark, 1968 earnings of $3.14 showed a gain. (Fully diluted 1968
was really lower than that by about 16 percent.)
Another aspect is the widespread use of pooling of interests in mergers.
This device enables an acquiring company to ignore for bookkeeping pur-
poses the excess of the acquisition price (e.g., $5 million in stock) over the
book value of its measurable assets (e.g., $3 million) by simply combining
the books of the two companies. These intangible assets (which are valued
in terms of the merger in our illustration at $2 million) although purchased
(with stock), never appear on the books of the conglomerate.
The Accounting Principles Board of The American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants recently proposed that the surviving corporation
be required to write off against earnings (over a period as long as 40 years)
the intangible assets acquired by merger. Such amortization will pull down
the earnings per share reported into the future and dampen enthusiasm for
some mergers.7
The intangible investment acquired by merger is neither less valuable
nor more depreciable than that which is home grown. So the reduction in
reported earnings resulting from this rule will not make them either more
accurate than or more comparable with the pre-merged situation, or less
subject to manipulation - only littler.
11. TRAITS THAT TEMPT TAKE-OvER
What characteristics make a company a tempting target for conglom-
erate take-over?8 Eight traits strike me as significant.
1. Bad Management
Incompetent management makes a company an easier take-over target
because unhappy stockholders are more susceptible. Incompetence in resist-
ing take-over is different from, and generally, although not necessarily, cor-
related with efficiency in maximizing the welfare of the common stockholder.
Superb management being scarce, there is no shortage of companies that
meet this requisite.
7 A recent study of 26 NYSE companies that have been active acquirers showed that
in 169 "poolings of interest," the difference between book value and purchase price aver-
aged almost two and a half times the book value. The impact upon reported earnings of
writing off these purchase intangible assets depends, of course, on the speed of write-off.
With five year write-off, the effect of pooling for 6 of these concerns was "to overstate"
1967 earnings -hypothetically, at least -by 50 percent or more, the study concluded.
The study, male by Professors Ronald M. Copeland and Joseph F. Wojdak of Pennsyl-
vania State University, was reported in the Wall Street Journal, February 27, 1970.
The SEC has required inclusion for prior years of companies that are acquired on a
pooling-of-interest basis in registration statements and in annual reports for at least the
preceding year. But the realities of internal growth of earnings could still be hidden
because purchases could be excluded.
8 Most companies who sell out are willing. Why? Estate, health, or successorship
problems; resource or know-how limitations on opportunity or a price he could not resist.
Why sell to this particular conglomerate? Generally because it best meets the seller's
particular needs for operational independence, congenial bosses, latest managerial tech-
nology, marketability, and a good investment at the merger price.
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2. Willing Management
Willing or peace-loving management has made many companies tempt-
ing targets. Inadequate estate diversification and insufficient liquidity to pay
estate taxes sometimes catapults smaller firms into the arms of conglomerates.
Aged and successorless management sometimes sees rescue there.
3. Excessive Liquidity
Cash-plethora has been a tempting take-over trait, particularly in the
early post-war years, when conglomerates were able to buy a company with
its own cash.
4. Unused Borrowing Power
An almost pathological aversion for debt on the part of industrial com-
panies has produced capital structures so bereft of leverage that a conglom-
erate could buy a company with its own excess and unused borrowing
power.
5. Excessive and Unproductive Plowback
Niggardly dividends tempt take-over by a tender which tops the payout
with a convertible preferred. Poor visibility of the prospective capital gains
that result from high plowback means that sometimes a company can be
bought for its own (capitalized) plowback. A company that invests its cash-
flow plowback unproductively is a tempting take-over target. Below-par
productivity of capital is signalled by acceptance of capital projects which
have prospective DCF rates of return that are lower than the company's
composite cost of equity and debt capital. Why does this make the company
tempting? Because it shows opportunities for profitable asset deployment
by internal channeling of investable cash that is generated by operations of
the take-over target company into other parts of the conglomerate where
opportunities are richer.
6. Huge Depreciation
Big book write-offs (depreciation and depletion) tempt take-over because
modest and disappointing reported book earnings can be accompanied by
big cash earnings relative to dividend payout. The result is that a company
can sometimes be bought with its own future stream of corporate savings. 9
7. Cash-flow Imbalance
Two kinds of imbalance of cash-flow render a company attractive. One
is cash generation that greatly and continuously transcends the company's
internal investment opportunities. This condition is indicated by a pile up
of cash or by low-return investments. A second kind is the converse: op-
9 Jones & Laughlin Steel Company, for example, had cash earnings which in the
three years, 1965, 1966 and 1967, aggregated more than $350 million. The market price of
its common stock in the second half of 1966 was a little less than $350 million.
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portunities for profitable investment that greatly exceed the companys cash
generation. Combining the two kinds of companies is an important eco-
nomic mission of conglomerates.
Most companies are in balance (forced or natural). A high proportion
of the $100 billion of business investment comes from cash-flow that is gen-
erated by operations and is rationed within corporate boundaries. Hence,
cash flow imbalance of either kind can make a company a logical take-over.
8. Unusable Tax Shields
The start of many a conglomerate was a merger with a tax-loss carry-
forward. The company was bought with its own potential income tax reduc-
ing power. More recently, it is future losses which can reduce the taxes of
acquired companies that makes big losers good bedfellows in the conglom-
erates. More complete and efficient use of tax shields - past, present and
prospective - has been an incentive to acquire; and stockholders benefit
from such mergers.10
III. SOURCES OF SUPERIOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Although conglomerates have been buried under an avalanche of con-
demnation, they do have sources of superior economic performance. Whether
these potential economic benefits will become actualities in any particular
conglomerate is uncertain. Whether they will result in net gain from con-
glomeration depends on the importance of offsetting drawbacks, examined
in the next section.
The basis of potential superiorities of a conglomerate is comparison with
its constituent companies, i.e., what would have happened absent conglom-
eration compared with what will happen with it.
The concept of economic performance here is a narrow one, limited to
private costs measured ultimately by long-run profitability and generally
indicated by competitive success. "Social costs" and impacts on the function-
ing of the national economy are beyond the scope of this analysis.
There are 10 potential sources of superior economic performance:
1. Better rationing of capital,
2. Better mobilization of internally-sourced capital.
3. Lower cost of capital.
4. Better allocation of human resources.
5. Better successorship.
6. Full utilization of tax shields.
10 Buying a tax loss carryforward is understandable, but would a conglomerate buy
future losses on purpose? Potential tax losses, yes: example, a railroad that can rip up
redundant tracks and thereby establish tax losses in the future. Another source of tax
benefit from merger is fuller use of tax shields. When the amount of the potential tax
shield (e.g., depletion or investment tax credit) that could be taken for tax purposes will
be limited by the amount of a company's profits, this limitation can sometimes be re-
moved (or reduced) by merger with a company that will have a plethora of profit.
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7. Greater managerial accountability.
8. Better financial controls.
9. Greater cross-industry mobility.
10. Scale economies of staff services.
1. Better Rationing of Capital
Corporate funds of a conglomerate can be deployed across former cor-
porate borders to those divisions where they will earn most. Funds can be
rationed more knowledgeably and efficiently within the corporate fold than
across corporate boundaries by the cumbersome, costly, and relatively igno-
rant allocation of funds by the impersonal capital markets, where leakages
of personal income taxes on dividends additionally deter movement and add
to its apparent cost. Who has seen in a prospectus any information about the
-specific capital projects in which the money will be invested? In contrast,
inside a conglomerate, proposed investments (intangible as well as tangible,
expensed as well as capitalized) can be made to compete for a common pool
of corporate funds on the basis of prospective return on that investment.
Moreover, the imposition of a minimum acceptable return which is based
on the composite cost of capital to that corporation is more explicit and
more likely than if rationed by the capital markets. Acquisitions of ad-
ditional companies (being a way of life for a conglomerate) should and can
compete with internal investments for funds. This should include buying in
the conglomerate's own stock when no internal or external investment
promises a higher yield.
Thus, expanded investment opportunities, intensified competition for
funds, and a clearcut criterion of their cost, can remove (or lessen) the
temptation which is present in some companies to prefer a low return invest-
ment to paying out highly taxed dividends.
2. Beiter Mobilization of Internally-sourced Capital
The supply of capital for corporate investment comes ultimately from
savings: of individuals, of corporations, and of governments. The corpora-
tion can itself save or can tap the savings of others. The main internal
source of funds, corporate savings, is the gross cash earnings generated by
operations, which constitute a common pool of future funds from which
dividends will be paid and new investments financed. In a conglomerate,
this pool should have corporate-wide availability for capital expenditures.
To restrict each division to the reinvestment of its own cash earnings
(depreciation charges, plus earnings), regardless of the productivity of its
proposed investment, would destroy a major source of economic superiority
of the conglomerate.
Another internal source of capital that is potentially better mobilizable
in a conglomerate is disposal of assets. Assets (e.g., plants, ventures, divisions)
should be sold if forecast to produce a rate of return on their disposal value
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which would be lower than the corporation's combined cost of capital. Such
disposals ought to be a more important source of capital for the conglom-
erate because the opportunities, the propensities and the incentives to re-
deploy its capital are greater.
Capital sources for this internal deployment of investment should (and
do) include divestiture (liquidation, spin-off or sale of majority control
of an operating unit). Divestment (and other asset disposal) is likely to be
more feasible and less unpalatable than for the acquired company, because
of the conglomerate management's lack of emotional attachment."
3. Lower Cost of Capital
Over the long run, conglomerates will probably have a lower composite
cost of capital than their constituent companies would have had. This is
mainly because of deeper debt, since the after-tax cost of conglomerates' con-
vertible preferred (which may ultimately be replaced by debt) is high. It is
reasonable to expect the price of common stock capital to be lower for a big
company, but there is little empirical evidence to support this belief. Because
of market disaffection, equity capital is currently more costly for a con-
glomerate than for a less diversified corporation of the same size. The cost
of debt capital to a conglomerate, however, is likely to be somewhat lower
than for its constituent companies.
The composite cost of capital is more affected by capital structure than
by differences among companies in the price of equity or the price of debt.
The after-tax cost of debt capital, even at today's 10 percent interest rates, is
much lower than that of equity capital. Depth of debt is determined more
by management's willingness to borrow than by its ability. The result is that
most industrial corporations have a composite cost of capital significantly
higher than would be attainable with deeper debt. Conglomerates may (be-
cause they are bigger and more diversified) be able to borrow deeper. But
more importantly, they will probably be willing to borrow deeper for two
reasons: first, because leverage has been heavily used by the management in
putting the empire together; and, second, because preferred stock (not being
tax deductible) impels subsequent replacement with debt.
4. Better Allocation of Human Resources
An important economy of corporate size is the ability to appraise the
performance and potentialities of executives so as to move and promote
them to where they will do the most good. It is important because the
11 During the period 1958 to 1968 Textron had ten divestitures, a fifth of the number
of acquisitions (51); LTV divested 9 units of its 21 acquisitions.
Conglomerates have recently used unconventional and imaginative methods of di-
vestiture. Open and widely publicized invitations to bid for a unit that a conglomerate
wants to sell off recently upset the conventional wisdom of secrecy and playing hard to
get. Northwest Industries is entertaining a proposal by senior executives of the Chicago
and Northwestern Railway that the road's 14,000 employees acquire this unit of the con-
glomerate. (Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1970).
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marketplace, despite the important contributions of stock options to ex-
ecutive mobility, and despite the rapid growth and prodigious accomplish-
ments of "executive-search" professionals, does not allocate executive re-
sources perceptively and efficiently across corporate boundaries. Quite un-
derstandably, corporations try to hide and hang on to their best. And this
happens also within a conglomerate, but to a lesser degree.
The gains from a more perfect intra-company market for talent are
reduced by the heterogeneity of management problems in a conglomerate.
Nevertheless, it has the potential of allocating its human resources better
than its unaffiliated constituent companies. Finally, conglomerates tend to
be more willing and more experienced in going outside for talent than most
companies, who tend to be a bit provincial about home grown executives.
5. Better Successorship
Failure to develop or find successors for top management has been an
important motive for selling out to a conglomerate. Implicit is a mutual be-
lief that the management of a large diversified company will be able to find
within its family or raid talent from outside and thus develop successor
management - better at least than that constituent company which has in
this failed.
Successorship may turn out, in the long run, to be a crucial deficiency
of the conglomerate. This depends on (1) whether the popular doctrine that
modern professional management (like Lord Jim) has ability in the abstract
which is highly transferable across industry lines proves fallacious, (2)
whether the limitations on profit center decentralization in conglomerates
can be overcome, and (3) whether a synthetic substitute for sharply focused
ownership motivation (e.g., stock options in partial spin-offs) can be de-
veloped. Consequently, assured successorship as a potential source of su-
periority is uncertain and perhaps, at best, marginal. 12
6. Fuller Utilization of Tax Shields
Bundling diverse corporations under a single tax return increases the
probability that tax losses will be fully utilized. It thereby steps up after-tax
profits - a widely accepted index of economic performance (whether or not
tax minimization of this sort is viewed as a social good).
7. Greater Managerial Accountability
Better measurement of management performance at the level of the
division (constituent company) and more accountability is a potential and
probable consequence of joining a conglomerate. Chances are that before
joining, neither the stockholders nor the directors have held a tight reign on
12 When a successful firm is taken over by a conglomerate, it is usual for some of
its executives to quit. The scope and status of some will shrink and all face an altered
bureaucratic environment. Because the dream of running his own show is dead, presi-
dential aspirants can be early casualties of the take-over.
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the president. In a public (i.e., dispersed ownership) company, directors tend
to be too eminent, too busy, too ignorant and too nice to ride the president
hard. Stockholders, even big institutional ones, nowadays sell the stock rather
than try to throw out or even castigate the management. In contrast, when
a company is taken over by a conglomerate, its management becomes ac-
countable, not to an invisible stockholder electorate or a benign board, but
to a professional "high command" which is likely to be geared to greed, and
able to have sophisticated economic mechanics of profit center decentraliza-
tion and measurement of management performance.
8. Better Financial Controls
Applications of managerial economics to operating financial manage-
ment have advanced rapidly in recent years. Its principles and even its pro-
cedures are more versatile and transferable than any other aspect of modern
management except portfolio investments, insurance and tax management. 5
Some conglomerates (e.g., Litton, Grace, I.T.T.) have assiduously mastered
advanced techniques of operating financial management. In sharp contrast,
many corporations that were taken over have been woefully deficient in
modern financial analysis and controls. Closing this cultural lag has been a
source of superior economic performance that may continue to be important.
14
9. Greater Cross-industry Investment Mobility
Conglomerates probably have somewhat greater capability of getting
into industries which have above average potential growth and profitability
than have their constituent companies were they unaffiliated. The concept
of a conglomerate should, I think, be an instittitionalized technique for
forced migration of investment under close managerial control, moving from
mature, profit generating industries which have passed their zenith of
growth, into new high-profit growth industries which (as in the human
family) must be initially subsidized by those of earning age. Guided by this
concept, a conglomerate will be more alert to foreseeable, underbuilt, growth
opportunities than would its unaffiliated constituents and more likely to do
something about it, 5 In this mission, conglomerates have, however, a serious
18 The capability of the computer to implement the simulation models, decision
rules, and DCF analysis of managerial economics makes it possible for technicians in the
new management sciences to make contributions to financial planning and control, even
though they are handicapped by lack of operating experience in the conglomerate's diver-
sified businesses.
14 The market once valued conglomerate stocks as though the growth in earnings per
share from this source would continue indefinitely. This gain is not projectable unless
acquisitions that are equally benighted continue at the same percentage rate indefinitely.
Moreover, there is little reason to suppose that growth of earnings from these infusions
of modern managerial economics will be faster than that of pre-existing companies which
already use advanced techniques of management science.
15 One mission of the conglomerate is to penetrate these new growth areas that the
investor, even if he recognized the promise, would not be able to exploit absent the
vehicle of the conglomerate. A second is to exploit a market-tested technical breakthrough
GROWTH BY CONGLOMERATE MERGER
constraint: a merger must not only be desirable but above all "doable," i.e.,
priced right and attainable by seduction or force.
10. Scale Economies of Staff Services
The savings of size obtained by conglomerates are not those of larger
scale manufacturing at the plant level. In most industries these scale
economies peter out at a relatively modest size. In any event they are usually
attainable by constituent firms without benefit of conglomeration. Anyhow,
if they are important, they would be achieved by horizontal rather than
conglomerate merger. The important scale economies of a conglomerate,
if there be any, are at the level of corporate staff services: research and de-
velopment, computers, programming, national advertising, financial staff
services, captial sourcing, etc. They are hard to measure and easy to over-
estimate. Most of these services can be obtained at the marketplace by
small-scale users at costs that are competitive with large-scale self-supply.
Even big companies hire Battel to do research, use time-shared computers,
buy software from outsiders, partner with strangers on national tele-
vision, and hire economic and financial consultants. The "make-or-buy"
choice is ever present and often close.
IV. SOURCES OF INFERIOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Offsetting these potential sources of superior economic performance are
some important deficiencies in the economic efficiency of conglomerates.
Several kinds are examined in this section. The benchmark for these sources
of inferior economic performance is -what would have happened had the
constituent company continued unaffiliated. The yardstick of economic ef-
ficiency is earnings after-tax, ideally economic profits in real terms stripped
of monopoly gains. Deficiencies of eight kinds strike me as important:
1. Distortion of corporate goals.
2. Non-economic product mix.
3. Limited cross-industry transferability of managerial ability.
4. Imperfect profit center decentralization.
5. Excessive size.
6. Excessive preoccupation with growth.
7. Top-heavy capital structure.
8. Impaired managerial incentives.
more massively and more efficiently than the acquired company -more massively by access
to internal employment of sources within a conglomerate and sometimes by removing
a capability-ceiling of internal growth. A man who has built up his own business to a
size equal to his personal capability, can sometimes, by using the professional staff services
of the conglomerate, get the capacity to profitably grow bigger. This presumes, of course,
that the founder will stay on'the job and that the conglomerate will be able to develop
successors.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
1. Distortion of Corporate Goals
Building a bigger empire appears from behavior to be the central goal
of some conglomerates. Perhaps we are entering a new era of financial
capitalism which will displace industrial capitalism. Possibly sheer size, and
the accompanying personal power of the financiers who create conglomer-
ates, will transcend the long-run welfare of the common stockholders as
the overriding goal of the conglomerate corporation. If this happens, it is
bound to impair the economic efficiency of the conglomerate and its con-
stituent companies.
Some economic theorists, relying on executive interviews and company
public statements, as evidence, say that growth has already quite generally
achieved a new and independent status as a corporate goal. 16
Maximization of long-run profits, i.e., maximizing the present worth,
at the corporation's cost of capital, of the per share dividends, and capital
appreciation, after taxes, should be, I think, and quite commonly is, the
overriding corporate goal.17 Any firm that does not have an impregnable
monopoly position had better concentrate on this objective if it does not
want to be shoved aside by those who do. Pursuit of stockholder welfare
leaves the company free to choose among strategies for attaining it but
makes subsidiary to it objectives such as maintaining market share, stability
of employment, and attaining any given rate of growth. Management and
stockholders should have no preference between growth and shrinkage in
size of firm, except as they may influence the present worth per share of
future stockholder benefits.
Significant departure from this overriding corporate goal on the part
of top management of a conglomerate produces economic inefficiency be-
cause it substitutes an inferior criterion of optimization (e.g., growth, size,
capacity-share, and diversity) in the trade-offs of current operating decisions
and in the rationing of capital for tangible and intangible investments.
2. Noneconomic Product Mix
The product lines of the typical conglomerate have been achieved ac-
cidentally. They are mostly the result of opportunity. The important trait
of each acquisition was that it was "doable." Rarely do the diverse products
and activities that result from opportunism actually support one another
synergistically (as is often claimed). Rarely do the product lines have sig-
nificant managerial similarities that obviate the need for managerial special-
16 Acceptance of this as evidence is seen in Baumol, On the Theory of Expansion of
the Firm, 52 AM. EcoN. REV. 1078 (1962).
17 The president of a Japanese company took interesting exception to my doctrine:
Japanese stockholders are essentially speculators, congenitally disloyal in-and-outers,
whereas executives commit their whole lives to a Japanese company, continuing in its
service from the day of college graduation until retirement. Consequently, he reasoned,
the overriding corporate goal should be the welfare of the executives, not of the stock-
holders.
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ization by industry and consequently produce net economization of manage-
ment.
Today, few diversified companies admit to being conglomerates. Hence
they seek and always find some plausible concept of similarity (recreation,
household needs, communication, etc.) with which to rationalize away their
diversity, which was, in reality, achieved mostly accidentally.' 8
3. Limited Cross-Industry Transferability of Managerial Ability
The diversity of the conglomerate's operations causes heterogeneity of
top management problems. The inevitable lack of specialized industry ex-
perience makes the High Command unable to master the intricacies and
ramifications of the highly diverse competitive situations and technologies
of its diverse industries. The conglomerate's chief executive lacks the in-
dustry experience needed to make good intuitive judgments on the crucial
imponderables. To justify acquiring companies in wildly diverse industries,
a new doctrine, "free form management," has been promulgated. It asserts
that a good manager can manage anything equally well, i.e., that mana-
gerial ability, having achieved the status of a profession, has the generality
of application which characterizes a profession, and is therefore fully trans-
ferable and equally efficient in any industry.
This is, I think, a fallacy. Except possibly for a few specialized, technical
staff activities, managerial efficiency is usually tied quite closely to the partic-
ular industry or setting in which the manager develops and operates. The rea-
son is that a good manager's intuitions grow out of long experience with the
special markets, competitive structure, and technology of a particular in-
dustry. When a new ownership group must rebuild a management from
outside, it raids rivals within the industry. "Executive-search" specialists
discourage industry jumping. In successful large corporations, most exec-
utives at or above the division manager level have long service records. Of
the 65 active executives whose portraits appeared in the 1962 annual report
of General Motors, only 6 have less than 20 years service with General
Motors. The 32 managers of domestic product divisions averaged 33 years.
The staff specialist exception, which is also supported by biography and
by executive raiding, reinforces the rule. It is only in those areas of func-
tional managerial specialization where there is a high degree of commonality
despite diversity of industrial application that centralized staff work by spe-
Is For example, the president of Northern Illinois Gas Company, after stoutly de-
claring that the utility doesn't intend to become a conglomerate but would stick to con-
nected activities which would have a direct bearing on the territory it serves, announced
aspirations for his company to build moderate income housing, provide tracts of land for
industrial development, mine recently discovered coal deposits, develop gas fueled waste
disposal units, automatic meter reading devices, fuel cells, and devices to use compressed
natural gas to power automobiles, and ultimately produce a protein for human consump-
tion made from natural gas (Chicago Tribune, January 18, 1970). The unifying concept
which removes the conglomerate curse from this variegated bundle of products is that they
all have "a direct bearing on the territory" which the utility serves.
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cialized professionals can be efficiently done for divisions with extreme diver-
sity as to industry, competitive situation, and marketing mechanism.
Examples include management of insurance, taxes, pensions, investment
portfolios, personnel mechanics, accounting, computers and some aspects
of management of money.
Generalized managerial ability exists primarily as a potentiality of the
young. Actual management productivity derives from specialization in the
technology and markets of a particular industry.
4. Imperfect Profit Center Decentralization
Profit center decentralization is an efficient means of delegating respon-
sibility for maximizing short-run profits while retaining control of most of
the investment decisions that affect profits in the long run. Experience over
the past 25 years indicates, however, that profit center structuring of man-
agement has not eliminated but only somewhat reduced the managerial
disadvantages of diversity and size. They are not eliminated because of
limitations of profit center decentralization. Four are important.
The first is that delegation of responsibility to maximize even short-run
profits is necessarily incomplete, due to imperfections of economic mechanics
and to ingenuity in ways to beat the performance measurement.
The second is that intangible investments in future profits (e.g., de-
velopment of products, markets, and people) war with current short-run
profits, by which the division manager's performance is dominantly mea-
sured. Yet these expensed investments in the future are intertwined with
current operations and their future effects are so hard to forecast that they
require a high order of experienced, specialized judgment. Consequently,
profit center managers are peculiarly qualified to make, or at least recom-
mend, such investments. Their performance in such futurities is much harder
to calibrate than on current profits and conflicts with it. Example: research.
A third limitation of profit center decentralization is the difficulty of
providing the profit center manager with motivation equivalent to owner-
ship. This is needed to make his interest identical with the owners, so that
his decisions and recommendations as to investments will conform to the
overriding goal of the corporation, namely to maximize the long-run welfare
of the common stockholder. Stock ownership or options in the mother com-
pany do not even approximate the narrow ownership incentives that are
needed for his profit center.10
Fourth, the industrial diversity of a conglomerate makes delegation of
responsibility for long-term profits more necessary - and more perilous.
Delegation is both more needed and more dangerous because the High Com-
mand does not have enough intimate experience with each diverse industry
19 Spin-off or public sale of part of the stock of a subsidiary can, by establishing a
market price, make possible executive ownership and stock options that can supply divi-
sion management with motivation for long-run profit maximization and provide a rough
measure of the present worth of these anticipated future earnings.
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to guide (or reverse) decisions of profit-center managers on intangible in-
vestments, where short-run profits must be sacrificed for long. Yet it is pre-
cisely these investment judgments -which must be made correctly in order
to get asset-redeployment benefits from conglomeration. Cash that is gen-
erated by losers must flow to winners. Reinvestment must be restrained in
obsolescent or moribund activities (because productivity of capital is low)
and their cash earnings deployed to activities where added investment has
high return. If the divisions of a conglomerate can really be as independent
of each other as the holdings of a mutual fund, they will perform better and
be worth more if freed from the restraints and burdens of a nonproductive
top management. If they are not this independent, then the "high com-
mand" has a function. And to perform this managerial function efficiently
requires it to cope with diversity without adequate specialized experience,
in the various industries under its control.
5. Excessive Size
Inefficient, nonmonopolistic concentration of wealth may be the chief
sin of conglomerates. It may also be a competitive handicap. From the
standpoint of efficiency in serving consumers (putting aside any social or
political effects of "concentration") three dimensions of size should be
distinguished: (1) size of the conglomerate as a whole, (2) size of its divisions
(profit centers, companies), and (3) size of plants (or other activity unit).
What should be the criterion of optimum size? Classically it is minimum
cost. But it could instead be (1) the optimum size for getting business (mea-
sured by changes in the market share of firms in different size classes) or
(2) optimum size for making money (measured by changes in share of profits
of "industry" for firms of different size classes or by comparison of rates
of return on investment) or (3) optimum size for survival (measured ulti-
mately by mortality rates or by changes in share of industry output produced
by each size-class over time.)20 This latter survivor technique measures also
relative efficiency of firms (or plants) of different sizes in coping with all the
problems that management actually faces.21
Profitability is, on the whole, the most relevant measure of economic
efficiency in the highly competitive American economy.
22
For conglomerates, a dramatic issue is the shape of the managerial cost
20 There is considerable acceptance (and some empirical support) of the proposition
that firms can be too small, but not too large, except in relation to the size of their market.
it is not, in my judgment, correct. The enormous difterences among industries in average
size of firm cannot be explained by market size; this would require an incredibly dis-
criminating and compulsive adaptation to this one environmental factor.
21 G. STIGLER, THS ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 72-80 (1968).
22 A major task of conglomerate management is to find: (a) the firm's most profitable
size, (b) the firm's most profitable array of activities (products), and (c) the optimum size
of each activity. The three are interrelated and may change as the firm's size changes. Each
optimum at each poinit in time will be influenced by technology (including advances in
management science, computers and profit centers) market size, consumer preferences, and
the conglomerate's tangible and intangible resources.
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curve. At what size do the scale economies of central management of a
diversified empire run out? Management is just another factor of production.
Like other kinds of labor, managers find it efficient to specialize by function
and by industry. Additional economies in the division of managerial labor
within the firm provide an incentive to grow to the size that permits full use
of an efficient managerial group. Beyond some point, the managerial cost
curve turns upward, with the exhaustion of managerial economies of scale
and the ever present rising costs of coordination. Larger firms exist but they
owe their size to the continued pull of scale economies of some sort (or to
lag in the marketplace correction of human error or to impregnable
monopoly position). For every very large firm, that is not a sheltered monop-
oly, a plausible and important source of scale economies can be found that
is entirely consistent with a rising managerial cost curve. If the management
of General Motors is superb, it has found a way to shift to the right the
rising curve of management cost, thus permitting a further exploitation of
the enormous scale economies attainable in the integrated design, produc-
tion, and marketing of motor driven vehicles and related products. The
equal availability of superior managerial talent has not been enough to
compensate for the absence of similar production scale economies in dozens
of other industries. For most companies, justification for larger size must
come from some scale advantage other than an alleged increase in the ef-
ficiency with which the enlarged company can use managerial resources.
After it attains some size, which is far below Fortune's 500, the conglom-
erate experiences rising costs of coordination and control. Where optimum
size appears to be large, this is explained by great economies of scale in
manufacturing, distribution, or research (or by an impregnable monopoly
position) rather than by scale economies in management.
6. Preoccupation with Growth
The economic efficiency of some conglomerates is impaired by preoc-
cupation with growth to the neglect of operating profitably. Growth by
acquisition is a way of life. Growth has become an independent, even over-
riding, corporate goal. Instead, it should be subsidiary to long-run profit
maximization. But in the current passion for "growth stocks," it is some-
times said that opportunity, creativity, and even profitability 8 all require
growth and that the only alternative to growth is decay. This is a fallacy.
Growth does sometimes supply a special sort of intoxicating atmosphere
in which employees may work longer or more effectively or for a smaller
current salary and in which some suppliers give special attention or conces-
23 Growth does not cause profits. Firms should, and generally do, grow in order to take
advantage of foreseen opportunities for unusual profits. Whether growth or profits come
first depends on ability to forecast and react to profit prospects. Sometimes a prolonged
experience of heightened profitability may be necessary before enough firms conclude that
expansion will also be profitable. Hence, time lags between changes in profitability and
changes in growth rate prove nothing about causation.
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sions to customers they think will become large accounts. A growing firm
sometimes finds it easier to bury mistakes. But it is easy to overstate the
long-range benefits of growth. Stable firms can, by progressiveness, achieve
much of the stimulating atmosphere of growth. Growth ought to be thought
of as a way of attaining optimum size when the firm is smaller than optimum.
7. Top-Heavy Capital Structure
Some conglomerates are saddled with high quasi-fixed charges. To get
the 80 percent ownership needed for a consolidated tax return, they swapped
convertible preferred with dividends considerably above those of the com-
mon stock it replaced. How can this increase in payout impair efficiency? In
two ways: first, the company's credit may suffer, its ability to finance cheaply
impaired more by passing a preferred dividend than by reducing or omit-
ting dividends on the common stock; second, the company pays more taxes
than if the senior securities were instead debentures. This is the price of a
"tax-free merger."
8. Impaired Managerial Incentives
Ownership is the cheapest incentive known to man. And the lively
anticipation of ownership runs a close second. We have not been clever
enough to develop an intra-conglomerate synthetic which gives the man-
ager of a constituent company incentives that are as powerful and that
parallel as closely the long run interests of the common stockholder as did
substantial ownership (or stock options) before the merger. Consequently,
the executives who built the constituent companies, even when they do con-
tinue, are often not quite the same men.
The heady responsibility, power and (sometimes illusory) freedom of
"running my own show" as president of an unaffiliated company attracts
and holds an entrepreneurial type of man which a big business bureaucracy
is not good at developing or holding. Although this kind of executive is
needed in our dynamic enterprise economy and is particularly needed by
the operating units of conglomerates, nevertheless the required incentives
and independence generally cannot be provided by conglomerates. So when
a successful private firm is taken over, some of the more enterprising souls
leave - in spirit if not in body. Also, it is distressingly common for some
of the older employees to see in the conglomerate's sharpened attention to
profitability, an abandonment of the firm's traditional interest in making
a better product than its competitors. Morale sometimes suffers because many
employees are less inspired by a goal of higher profits than by a goal of a
better product (even though it will ultimately lead to higher profits). Im-
pairment of morale from this source may be more a result of poor com-
munication or poor translation of a profit objective into subsidiary goals
than a result of a different overriding goal.24
24 But sometimes take-over brings a change in master goal: for example, when
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Management will, I think, prove to be the crucial deficiency of the
conglomerate. Two spots are critical: (1) Top talent, which is scarce and
hard to reproduce, and (2) Division managers. Rare gifts are required at
the top to run a diversified company well. Hence its fortunes are peculiarly
sensitive to the competence, stamina and motivation of one or two men at
the top. Can ITT find, groom and select for succession another Harold
Geneen? Can Litton develop equally gifted successors for Thornton and
Ash? The other critical spot is heads of the operating divisions who feel
downgraded and neglected. Isolated and restrained by intervening echelons
and by specialized staff, division managers find that bureaucratic, rather
than entrepreneurial, traits have survival value. Criteria of optimization
are distorted toward maximizing the manager's score in this new ball game.
V. TRANSITION
The purpose of this concluding note is to ease the transition from the
low plane of the preceding essay to the loftier level which is to come. Eco-
nomic performance, in my analysis, is confined to that reflected by private
costs and roughly measured by competitive success and ultimately by profit-
ability. Hence the measuring rod of efficiency is after-tax earnings in the
long run (ideally in constant dollars and stripped of monopoly profits).
Social costs that are not reflected in private costs are not considered; and
broader consequences for the economy as a whole are neglected. The view-
point is essentially that of the non-peripatetic stockholder.
Looking at conglomerate mergers more broadly in terms of their con-
tribution to the functioning of a private enterprise economy raises different
questions concerning their economic effects. Does conglomeration cause:
1. Quicker responsiveness to changed desires of consumers?
2. Prompter commercialization of scientific advances?
3. Better allocation of resources?
4. Greater responsiveness to the welfare of owners?
To answer these questions is beyond the scope of this introduction.
Some intimations of the foregoing analysis may nevertheless be noted to
speed the transition. The benchmark of comparison is what would have
happened had the companies continued unaffiliated.
Speedier responsiveness to consumers' signals is a potential. Conglom-
eration makes possible a wider panorama of search for the areas of future
growth in demand, a more concerted and systematic effort to forecast future
growth in demand, and fewer inhibitions about crossing industry lines to
exploit the future. These three traits can make a conglomerate better able
to see (or foresee) the signals of consumers. Little fellows can move quicker;
they inadvertently do much painful market testing for big rivals gratis. But
potential profitability has been neglected or subordinated to vanity, or inertia. Impaired
morale from this source is good.
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the conglomerate can respond to these validated consumer signals massively.
How? First, because of its eagerness to buy "growth," i.e., to acquire (and
sometimes pay dearly for) a small company in a promising new industry
as an expansion base, and second, because of its greater resources and in-
ternal mobility of capital.
Responsiveness to changed consumer demands requires contraction on
some fronts as well as expansion on others. Conglomeration can achieve
speedier disinvestment than the agonizing, dilatory procedures of bank-
ruptcy. Partly this is because economic foresight is more objective than that
of a corporation's president whose life work is becoming obsolete. Partly
it is because of more prompt and cold-blooded capital rationing. The con-
glomerate possesses a superior, more efficient mechanism both (1) for milking
an obsolescent operation and flowing its cash earnings to investment in
more promising divisions and (2) for liquidating a poor performer.
The potential is there for more massive responses to consumers' whims,
but will it in fact be attained? That depends on the conglomerate's ability
to get a good management and to motivate executives entrepreneurially.
As to the second question, speeded commercialization of a technological
breakthrough does sometimes result from conglomeration. In the earlier
"shirt-losing" stages, commercial application of new technology is usually
done better and faster by myriads of backyard inventors and Route 128-type
scientist entrepreneurs than by the bureaucracy of a big corporation's new
products division. At a later stage the conglomerate has ability to obtain and
marshal resources and specialized skills to exploit large and expanding op-
portunities on a scale and at a speed that is usually unattainable by a mem-
ber company standing alone. This can achieve a decisive competitive head-
start advantage in market position and economies of scale.
2 5
Speeding of the spread of advanced managerial technology and finan-
cial controls, profit center decentralization, capital rationing and capital
sourcing, is a likely consequence of conglomerization. Some staff functions
have a high commonality among diverse divisions and hence benefit from
the higher specialization and greater rewards of expertness and modernity.
As to the third question, better allocation of resources is, I think, a
likely result. (Better in an economic sense, confined to private costs.) Su-
perior mobility of resources results from speeded cross-industry migration
of capital: achieved by a pattern of acquisitions and disposals which will
milk (and ultimately shrink, close down or sell off) low profit activities
and channel their cash generation (and sales proceeds) into the acquisition
and forced growth of activities which are in growing demand and short
supply, hence yield super profits of innovation and growth. In addition
to this superior deployment of investment within its borders, the con-
25 The importance of internal growth of a conglomerate built upon acquired beach-
heads is indicated by sales growth of ITT of 12 to 14 percent in 1969 from internal growth
alone - over $500 million - predicted by Harold Geneen (as reported in Electronic News,
March 24, 1969).
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glomerate usually has greater access and willingness to raise money out-
side. Deployment of people is a related and more dubious potential
superiority. Conglomerates usually acquire the executives as well as the
assets. Versatility aside, deployment of management people internally is
usually easier and better informed than is movement of executives across
corporate boundaries.
A high proportion of the nation's savings are corporate savings (depre-
ciation plus net profits). And a high proportion of investment (intangible
plus tangible) is financed by the corporation's own cash flow. Consequently,
although in principle, capital rationing could be done by the security
markets, most equity capital has been sourced internally in recent years.
Hence the practical choice for our problem lies between doing it inside
the small constituent companies or inside the larger conglomerate.
Does conglomerate merger make management more responsive to the
interests of stockholders? Conglomerates, like professional managerial revo-
lutionaries, give stockholders who are unhappy about management, an
option (other than selling their stock). And greater responsiveness to the
long-run welfare of the owners may result from threat of take-over. Man-
agers of the individual units of a conglomerate are, moreover, held to
stricter accountability for profit, sales and market share performance than
is the president of most independent companies. Offsetting this in some
degree is the increased personal power of the head of the conglomerate
and the propensity of many to expend their energies on acquisitions and to
put growth and personal power ahead of the long-run welfare of the
owners. Thus, the degree to which conglomeration increases responsiveness
to the welfare of owners is extremely sensitive to the competence and the
motivation of the chief executive and his ability to develop, keep, and
motivate managers of the constituent companies in the absence of being
able to give them the two strongest motives of an enterprise system: owner-
ship and independence. Offsetting these are three unfavorable potentials
for the common stockholder. First, he frequently pays what in retrospect
looked like a high price for the acquisitions. Even though it was traded
out in high-multiple Chinese dollars, the cost in preferred dividend re-
mains after the convertibility bubble has burst. Second, he is saddled with
heavier fixed charges of preferred dividends and usually pays higher cor-
porate income taxes than would have been the optimum tradeoff for post-
poning the seller's capital gains taxes; thus he pays a stiff price for the
magic of a "tax free" deal which makes acquisitions easier for the cor-
porate conquistadors. Third, he endures substantial and vaguely known
dilution of his long-run future welfare by convertibles and warrants.
